VachanSetu

A consent record you can check yourself.

Section 6(10) of the Act puts the burden on the Data Fiduciary to show that notice was given and consent was taken. A record only you can vouch for is weak evidence. This page explains how each VachanSetu record is made checkable by someone who trusts neither you nor us.

What happens to a consent after the person agrees

Four things happen, each on its own schedule. A withdrawal or a change goes through the same four.

  1. 1

    At once

    Written in one fixed form and signed

    The consent is written as a small JSON record: who agreed (as a pseudonym), to which purposes, under which version of the notice, in which language, and when. The record is serialised in one canonical form and signed with your organisation's Ed25519 key. A receipt goes back to the person.

  2. 2

    Within a minute

    Sealed into a block

    A sealer gathers the new records into a block and computes one hash over all of them, a Merkle root. The block header carries that root and the hash of the block before it, and is signed. Changing any record changes the root. Changing any block breaks every block after it.

  3. 3

    Every hour

    Timestamped by an independent authority

    The roots of the hour's blocks are combined into one value and sent to a timestamp authority outside our control. Its signed reply fixes the latest time by which those blocks existed. Rewriting history afterwards would need that authority's key as well as ours.

  4. 4

    Every day

    Sent to you as a signed digest

    Each organisation receives the hash of its latest block by email and webhook. Keep it. It is your own copy of where the record stood that day, held outside our systems.

A scheduled check also recomputes every hash, signature and timestamp against what was stored, and raises an alert if anything differs. The database refuses updates and deletes on the ledger, and its write-ahead log is archived under a lock that cannot be lifted early. Those are described on the security page.

How one record is tied to its block

A block may hold thousands of consents. A receipt does not need to carry them all.

Records are hashed in pairs, and the pairs in pairs, up to one root. To show that a record is under that root, the receipt carries only the hashes beside its path: two in this example, about twenty for a block of a million records.

You hash the record, fold in those hashes in order, and compare the result with the root in the signed block header. If one character of the record had changed, the result would differ.

How one consent is tied to its blockThree consents are hashed in pairs up to a single root. The receipt for the first consent carries the hashes of the other two, which is enough to recompute the root that the signed block header names.Block roote751d402…7486Hash of the paircomputed by youThis consent10eb851f…3e3aAnother consent7f4f7a5d…a7c4Another consente7d0940f…408bnamed in the signed block headerthese two hashes travel on the receipt

Block 1 of the worked example in the artefact specification.

Verify a sample receipt in your browser.

The receipt below is the worked example from the specification. The four checks run on this page with your browser's own cryptography. Tick the box to edit the record, and watch which checks fail.

Consent receipt

Sample from the public specification
Event
Consent given, 20 Nov 2026
Newsletter
Granted
Order updates
Refused
Notice shown
Privacy notice, version 1, English
Artefact hash
a0996e9ee8c9d9cc…bf5ba7b2
Signing key
vs-Zm9ydHk0Mm5vdGFSZWFsS2V5-1
Sealed in
Block 1, with two other consents

What your browser checks

  1. The record matches the hash on the receipt

    The record is written out in one fixed form and hashed with SHA-256.

  2. The organisation signed exactly this record

    An Ed25519 signature, checked against the organisation's published key.

  3. The record is part of the sealed block

    Two hashes from the receipt lead from this record to the block's root.

  4. The block is signed and names that root

    Each block also names the hash of the block before it.

The same checks can be written in any language in an afternoon. The record format, the test values and the procedure are in the developer guide.

What a valid receipt proves, and what it does not

It helps to know exactly where the proof stops.

It proves

  • Your organisation's signing key signed exactly these bytes.
  • The record is one leaf of a signed block.
  • That block is part of one unbroken chain, because each block names the hash of the block before it.
  • With the hourly timestamp, the block existed by the time the authority states.

It does not prove

  • It does not prove who the person is. The ledger holds a pseudonym, and the identifying details are kept apart from it.
  • It does not prove that the notice text was fair or that the purpose is lawful. It proves which notice version was shown.
  • It does not prove that your systems obeyed the decision. The decision log and the webhook deliveries are the evidence for that.

A person can be erased without breaking the record.

The ledger never holds a name, an email address or a phone number. It holds a random pseudonym. The link from that pseudonym to a person sits in a separate vault, encrypted with a key that belongs to that one person.

Erasing a person deletes their key. The vault entry can no longer be read, and the pseudonym points at no one. Every record, block and signature stays as it was, so every other receipt still verifies.

How long the proof itself is kept after erasure is a retention decision for you and your counsel.

Built on published standards

Every primitive is a public standard with independent implementations, so a verifier does not depend on our code.

StandardWhat it isWhere it is used
RFC 8785JSON Canonicalization SchemeOne byte-exact form for every record
FIPS 180-4SHA-256Record, leaf, node and block hashes
RFC 8032Ed25519Signatures on records and block headers
RFC 6962, RFC 9162Merkle tree hash and inclusion proofsSealing records into a block and proving one is in it
RFC 3161Time-stamp protocolThe hourly timestamp from an independent authority

Each organisation's public keys are published without authentication, with the period each key was valid for. Rotating a key adds a new one. Nothing is ever signed again, so an old receipt keeps verifying against the key that signed it.

Record a consent and verify it yourself.

The sandbox issues real signed receipts in test mode. Record one, wait a minute for it to be sealed, and check it with your own code.